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ABSTRACT
ANNA GRAY TERRY: La Alegría Ya Viene: How Chile’s Youth are Reshaping History
(Under the direction of Professor Kate Centellas)

The highly controversial military dictatorship in Chile lasted from 1973 to
1989. General Augusto Pinochet’s neoliberal policies saved the country from
economic ruin in the 1980’s, but Chile became highly socially unequal as a result.
After he was democratically voted out of office, politicians decided not to change
his economic policies in order to avoid a collapse, and those policies are still in
place today, specifically in terms of education. Therefore, an entire generation of
Chileans has grown up after the dictatorship under these same highly unequal
education policies, and as a result, they have begun to protest. What started in
2011 has become a national movement for a more equal education system. This
has manifested itself in violent protests as well as negative imagery of Pinochet
throughout Chile. This thesis explores the relationship between the education
movement and formation of public memory about the dictatorship, and further,
what role young Chileans play in said formation. By highlighting how young
Chileans view Chile’s relationship to the past, it is possible to assess what kind of
future they want their country to have.
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction
Mid-way through my semester abroad in Valparaíso, Chile, in the spring of 2013,
the university I was attending, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, was
declared to be en paro, at a stop. This was not because of a natural disaster or some
disgruntled employees, but because its students had voted it so. For the entire second half
of the semester, only the foreign students attended classes. Meanwhile, there were dozens
of demonstrations where hundreds of students would dress in black and march through
the town, and they often became violent: Students would release tear gas, break windows,
and deface buildings. This happened with enough frequency to the point that residents
became immune to the fuss. At one point, our building’s status went from en paro to en
toma, taken over, and students barricaded the classrooms with chairs and desks and
walked around on the roofs to make sure no one could enter. It was terrifying for me, but
for the average Chilean student, this was normal. Violent protests were happening in
universities throughout Chile, and they had been happening every semester since 2011.
Students are demanding change. The current secondary and tertiary education
system is highly unequal: high-quality high schools and universities are expensive, the
cheap universities lack distinction, and there are laws keeping this in place. It has not
always been this way, though. Before the 1970’s, higher learning was universally free,
but Chile’s right-wing dictatorship of 1973-1990 put an end to free education. Among
other neoliberal reforms, General Augusto Pinochet completely privatized the education
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system, offering no subsidies to public high schools and universities or grants or loans for
students, leaving students with the only option for quality education as expensive private
schools. This made the education system highly unequal, and although some policies
have changed since Chile’s transition to democracy in 1989, the education system
remains almost completely the same as the way it did when it was instituted by Pinochet.
One of the most interesting things about the movement for educational reform is
that Chileans are only beginning to protest this now. There have been sporadic protests
since 2007, but only in the last two years has Chile made waves in demanding change.
Curiously, protests for educational reform did not happen as soon as Chile became a
democracy. Rather, twenty years later, especially while the rest of Latin American
countries’ higher education systems have been either free or very cheap and Chile’s
higher education system is some of the most expensive in the world. So why is Chile
protesting now specifically?

Public Memory
The lens through which I would like to answer this question is public memory,
because the generation of Chileans who are protesting is the generation whose only frame
of reference of the Pinochet regime is public memory and personal recollections of their
elders. Before defining what public memory is, it should be noted that the term “public”
refers to what can be seen or accessed by anyone in a given area. In the context of my
studies, this will refer to newspapers, movies, documentaries, artwork, buildings,
monuments, music, and so on, which are all vehicles through which people can express
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their perspectives in a way that anyone can see. It is with this definition that public
memory can be understood. According to a John Bodnar, a leading public memory
theorist and historian, public memory is defined as a

body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society
understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future. . . [It]
speaks primarily about the structure of power in society because that
power is always in question in a world of polarities and contradictions and
because cultural understanding is always grounded in the material
structure of society itself. (Bodnar 15-17)

In other words, public memory is a way to understand how a culture attempts to
understand itself from a historical perspective. People can create public memory by using
the media aforementioned to reflect upon past events, which will ideally influence those
who view it to consider what the creators want the viewers to believe about the historical
event and be changed by it. And then, if enough people’s perspectives on a historical
event are influenced by a display of public memory, that can have important implications
on what the society chooses to let happen in the future. Therefore, the creation of public
memory ultimately attempts to mold the future of society by making statements about the
past.
According to anthropologist and public memory specialist Alexander Dent, there
are two types of cultural practice that create public memory: “inscribing ones, in which
participants pay explicit attention to the inculcation of memory, and incorporating ones,
where memory slips in without much being said” (Dent 188). Inscribing cultural practices
take shape in museums, statues, slogans, and so on, whereas the latter consists of
“performances that inculcate history through the physical experience,” meaning physical
8

experiences like ritual (Dent 189). In other words, inscribing practices are the active
formation of public memory while incorporating practices are passive. Inscribing
practices specifically and intentionally create a particular interpretation of a historical
moment, and are thus a highly active and calculated way to create an argument about
something. While incorporating cultural experiences are an important aspect of the
creation of public memory, the majority of my studies will be about the inscription of
public memory because I want to find out if there is an intentionally created link between
public memory of the dictatorship and the student protests, on which I will elaborate in
the next section.
The use of inscribed public memory in order to shape perceptions has been used
throughout post-conflict societies all over the world. For example, after the deadly
Chechen War in Russia from 1994-1996, public memory of the war’s atrocities became a
tool for political power: “The right to memory was transformed into the ‘right to justice’
and the ‘never again’ rhetoric was used by the separatist faction within the Chechen
nationalist movement to defend its yet contested political project” (Campana 141). In this
case, politicians used negative public memory of the war by making it part of their
campaigns in order to gain followers. Further, in Tours of Vietnam: War, Travel Guides,
and Memory, the author argues that after the Vietnam War, American guidebooks of
Vietnam “repeatedly represented events in ways that favor the global ambitions of the
United States” (Laderman 94). While the Vietnam War happened on Vietnamese soil,
Americans were able to influence the creation of public memory through travel books for
tourists who would be visiting Vietnam so they could deepen American nationalism and
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imperialism. These examples prove that public memory is intentionally created to make
the audience-- whoever that may be-- perceive events in the way that the maker wants
them to, which can have important, lasting social and political effects on society.
Two of the most striking displays of public memory that I encountered in Chile
were a brand new, state-of-the art museum called the Museum of Human Rights
Memory 1 and a photo that I came across in an exhibit within a small history museum
called Londrés 38. The Memory Museum had three floors that walked its guests through
exhibits representing the years from approximately 1970 to 1990, recounting the coup
d’état, the political atmosphere during the regime, personal accounts of human rights
abuses, and the plebiscite that ended the dictatorship. At the end of the tour, there was a
glass room illuminated by electric candles that looked upon an enormous blue wall
featuring a framed, black-and-white photograph of every single person who was killed or
tortured by the Chilean government. The room had an interactive map, where viewers
could search for names, click on pictures, and learn the stories of each person on the wall,
making the museum incredibly intimate and personalized. It was emotionally
overwhelming to experience as an American, so I cannot imagine how it would feel to see
it as a Chilean. However, from personal conversations I had about the museum with
friends, professors, and my host family, there were some who were not interested in
going, some who insisted how important it was to experience, and some who told me
they would never go.

1

Museo de la Memoria de los Derechos Humanos
10

Museo de la Memoria’s wall of faces
Photo by SaladeHistoria via FlickRiver.com

The other artifact that struck me in my time abroad was a photograph I found in
an exhibit within a small history museum in Santiago. The museum was called Londrés
38, named after its street address. It was a small, unmarked house-- practically invisible
in an affluent neighborhood in the heart of Santiago, but it had a very dark past: It was
one of the many offices where Chilean dissidents were interrogated, tortured, and
ultimately disappeared by the government. The house was empty; they left no torture
tools, no pictures on the walls, nothing. There were just facts written on a few of the
walls.

11

Words above the fireplace at Londrés 38
Photo by author
This was the only picture I got of some of the writing-- It was in the first room of
the house, and after that, it felt disrespectful to take photographs. Below are the picture I
took of the writing as well as its translation:
“This place, right in the middle of Santiago, functioned as the detention,
torture, and extermination center known as Londrés 38. From here began
forced disappearances as a systematic practice of terrorism by the State
imposed in Chile in September of 1973.
A number of people not yet determined were detained here, and as far as
can be established, 96 prisoners were either executed, forced to disappear,
or died afterwards as a consequence of the torture; of them, 83 men and 13
women, two of the women pregnant. The majority were young militants,
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primarily from the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), the Communist
Party and the Socialist Party.
Before the denunciation of these crimes, and as a form of concealment, the
dictator substituted the number 38 for the number 40, which still existed
until recently.
If not for the action of the ex-detained, relatives of the victims and social
organizations, this center would still be ignored. Virtually “erased” from
the city.”2

A guide solemnly explained to me and a group of foreign students the human
rights abuses that had taken place here, along with the historical context. He told us that
leaving the house empty was intentional-- we were supposed to make up our own minds
about what happened there, and about how we wanted to remember it. While this was all
very moving, what I found curious was that on the top floor, one empty room was
dedicated to the student movement for education reform. There were professional
photographs displayed neatly through the room, each telling a story about the protests.
One that I found particularly interesting was of a man in the middle of a protest, holding
up a sign that read, “Pinochet: May your legacy die!”3

2

En este lugar, en pleno centro de Santiago, funcionó el recinto de detención, tortura y exterminio conocido
como Londrés 38. Desde aquí se dio inicio a la desaparición forzada, como práctica sistemática del
terrorismo de Estado impuesto en Chile, en septiembre de 1973.
Un número aún no determinado de personas permaneció detenido aquí y, hasta donde se ha podido
establecer, 96 prisioneros fueron ejecutados, hechos desaparecer o murieron posteriormente a consecuencia
de las torturas; entre ellos 83 hombres y 13 mujeres, dos de ellas embarazadas. En su mayoría eran jóvenes
militantes, principalmente del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), del Partido Comunista y del
Partido Socialista.
Ante la denuncia de estos crímenes, y como forma de ocultamiento, la dictadura sustituyó el número 38 por
el 40, el que hace poco aún permanecía.
De no haber sido por la acción de los ex detenidos, familiares de las víctimas y organizaciones sociales,
este recinto aún permanecería ignorado. Virtualmente “borrado” de la ciudad.
3

“Pinochet: ¡Que muera tu herencia!”
13
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Photo of a protest sign in Londrés 38
Photo by author

To me, seeing this photograph within the torture house meant that, at least to the
organization who runs Londrés 38, there is a direct connection between the dark past of
the Pinochet regime of the 1970s and 80s and the education movement of today. This
could be because of the significant amount of students who were victims of human rights
abuses during the Pinochet regime, and it could also be because Pinochet’s policies still
have a grip on the education system. Either way, the fact that an art exhibit about current
education protests was intentionally placed inside of a museum about torture during the
Pinochet regime demonstrates a compelling link between two of Chile’s most important
moments in history, and it was what sparked my interest in exploring how Chileans are
currently forming their own public memory of the Pinochet regime and how that is linked
to today’s student protests.

Research Question and Hypothesis
My goal is to explore what kind of relationship the education movement has with
the formation of public memory about the dictatorship, and further, what role young
Chileans play in said formation. In order to do this, I must also find out if there is a
correlation between approval of Pinochet and age (to see if changes in perception are
generational), if those perceptions affect opinions on current political movements like
educational reform, and what that means for Chilean society. I have chosen to focus on
generation instead of any other category of identity because of the varying relationships
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each age category has with the dictatorship: Chileans older than 50 grew up under his
regime, experiencing the best and the worst of his ways-- Pinochet saved Chile’s
economy both after he took office and during the 1980s while the rest of Latin America
was experiencing the Lost Decade, but tortured and killed thousands of Chileans in the
process. Meanwhile, people from approximately 25-50 years of age remember the
regime, but in different ways: They were young when it happened-- maybe too young to
understand his economic policies and more removed from the human rights abuses than
their parents. Lastly, there is the generation of Chileans under 25-- namely college
students, for the purpose of my research-- who are the first generation to have no memory
of the dictatorship whatsoever, meaning that their perception of him is created mainly by
what their elders tell them and public memory rather than personal experience. Because
younger generations of any democratic society tend to hold much political sway and have
a direct influence on the future of their societies, it is important to investigate exactly how
the upcoming generation of post-dictatorship Chileans feel about their past, and in turn,
their future.
Therefore, I predict that there is indeed a correlation between approval of
Pinochet and age. I think that the youngest generation will have a highly negative
perception of the Pinochet regime, as they are the most open about political reform and
are the most removed from the dictatorship. However, they have no memory of the
atrocities that happened during his regime and have only been alive while Chile was
prospering from the relatively untouched architecture of his policies, making their stance
more ambivalent. I believe that the middle generation will be even more negative in their
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beliefs about Pinochet because they may have actual memory of the regime and can thus
recall the atrocities for themselves, perhaps even knowing some of the victims who may
be parents or other older loved ones. Furthermore, I predict that because older-generation
Chileans were old enough to experience the emotional trauma of the human rights abuses
and social stratification of Pinochet’s dictatorship, yet also witnessed his policies save
their economy, they will have a much more nuanced perception of Pinochet’s regime.

Methodology
The first thing I did in order to test my hypothesis was administer surveys to
Chileans via Facebook and email regarding their opinions on Pinochet, the education
protests, and public memory. I administered the surveys through Facebook and email so
that I could reach all age groups. I also interpreted already-existing Chilean data about
current perceptions of Pinochet to further my analysis of the surveys. I additionally
examined trends in popular culture since Chile’s transition to democracy through films,
music, and media to see what kind of public memory is being formed surrounding the
legacy of Pinochet, and by whom.

Upcoming Chapters
In Chapter Two, I will present a history of Chile since 1970 by looking into the
policies and politics of Salvador Allende, Augusto Pinochet, and following presidents. In
Chapter Three, I will give an in-depth account of the education system and the student
protests, as well as a snapshot of current politics in the country. In Chapter Four, I will
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present my findings about the creation of public memory within Chile by looking at
music, art, film, and so on. In Chapter Five, I will present the findings of my surveys in
order to answer my research question about the relationship between Pinochet, the
education movement, and age. In Chapter Six, I will discuss how those two are related,
place my findings in the larger context of Latin America, and present my conclusions.
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CHAPTER TWO: A Brief History of Chile

From Socialism to Authoritarianism: 1970-1990
Elected in 1970 as a member of the Socialist Party, which was a part of the
Unidad Popular (UP) coalition, Socialist President Salvador Allende faced challenges to
his presidency from before he stepped into office until the day he was overthrown.
Having run for president four times before winning, he only narrowly secured the
nomination of the Socialist Party, and only won with 36 percent of the vote. While he did
make reforms like giving every child free milk, his promises to “nationalize the economy,
implement a massive program of income redistribution, end the dominance of the
latifundia, transform the political system through the creation of a unicameral
legislature,” and so on, were almost always restricted by both the opposition he faced and
the lack of organization and support within his own party (Bethell 158).
Lasting only three years, his presidency was marred with an economic recession,
internal factionalization, and political violence. In Allende’s first year as president,
Chile’s GDP grew in 1971 by 7.7% overall and unemployment fell from 8.3% to 3.8%
(Bethell 161). While this was great for his presidency, the economic boom was shortlived: The price of copper-- Chile’s most important raw export-- fell significantly in
1971, and the trade balance turned from a US $95 million surplus in 1970 to a deficit of
$90 million in 1971, which was a serious blow to his presidency. Further, Chile’s other
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economic problems, like “breakdowns in the distribution system, industrial conflict, the
growth of a black market, the decline in private investment, [and] uncontrolled monetary
expansion” all multiplied in 1972 and 1973, which were all serious blows to his
credibility (Bethell 163). While Allende was very successful in decreasing income
disparity, nationalizing copper mines, and accelerating land reform, the aforementioned
external factors were enough for Allende to lose a significant portion of his popularity.
Chile’s increasing economic turmoil only furthered the polarization of those
within government. Members of his own Socialist Party declared that “revolutionary
violence [was] inevitable and necessary,” essentially endorsing violence in the name of
Socialism, which “embarrassed the Allende government and gave an opportunity to the
Right to create fears about the intentions of the UP as a whole” (Bethell 159). On top of
that, the opposition obtained the majority in house, causing the political center to
essentially disappear; and Allende’s “own moderation made [him] increasingly isolated as
his supporters developed new forms of political organization outside the control of the
executive” (Bethell 167). Many Chileans felt that the government had lost control, so
political violence rose among citizens in both rural and urban areas. For example, after a
proposal to increase state control over supplies to the trucking companies in October
1972, workers “virtually paralyzed” the transport sector by having “powerful” solidarity
strikes that sparked military intervention (Bethell 174).
The military felt threatened by the Allende government for multiple reasons.
Because worker uprisings like this were not uncommon during Allende’s presidency, the
military had to frequently become involved in order to keep the peace, which created
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resentment between them and the UP government. Additionally, Latin American
revolutionaries like Castro established relationships with Allende and began making
extended visits Chile to share ideas, which sparked rumors that there might be an armed
revolution like ones that Castro had led. Obviously, the military was opposed to this
notion, as political violence was already surging within the country and they were bearing
the brunt of trying to keep the peace. The army even resented Allende’s personal
bodyguards called the Group of Friends of the President, who were from the extreme left
wing of the UP. Throughout Allende’s presidency, the Right constantly called on the
military to hold a coup, and eventually, the military became involved even though they
previously “had intervened only intermittently in the political process” (Bethell 175).
When the military entered the cabinet to oversee the March 1973 elections and there were
inconclusive results, the politicians of the Right convinced the military that the only
solution was to hold a coup d’état to get rid of Allende, who was, in their eyes, destroying
the peace and prosperity of their country.
Therefore, on September 11, 1973, there was a military coup to overthrow the
Allende government, placing the military general Augusto Pinochet into power as a
dictator. The coup was “warmly embraced” by the United States (who had tried and failed
to organize a military coup three years earlier) because Allende’s presidency was
perceived as a threat to democracy; the coup was also embraced by the Chilean elite, who
believed Allende’s policies were economically destroying the country, and in turn, their
wealth (Dinges 3). Tanks and soldiers stormed the capital building, La Moneda, and when
Allende realized what was happening, he killed himself in his office rather than surrender
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to the military. The next day, General Augusto Pinochet was placed at the head of the
military junta, thus becoming the dictator of Chile for the next 17 years.
One of the first things Pinochet did upon becoming president was drastically
change Chilean fiscal policy in order to recuperate the economy that fell apart during
Allende’s term. With the help of the Chicago Boys, a group of young Chilean economists
educated at the University of Chile and the University of Chicago, Pinochet created a
fiscal policy that was based on the belief that “private forces should guide economic and
social activities, not the state,” widely referred to as neoliberalism, which ultimately
placed the majority of the country’s wealth into the pockets of a small elite (Hecht 139).
In the first years of Pinochet’s regime, for example, the military government began
selling enterprises that had been under Allende’s state control, and the only people who
were already wealthy could afford to buy them. By 1979, “135 of the 250 largest private
enterprises were under the control of the ten largest financial conglomerates” (Hecht
144). Banks were also privatized, which facilitated the growing concentration of wealth
because the conglomerates could “acquire enterprises through leveraged buyouts
financed by the banks, which had, in turn, borrowed the money from private foreign
banks” (Hecht 144). Not only did this lead to a burgeoning amount of foreign debt, but it
also meant that a very small group of people held incredible amounts of power. As for
the majority of Chileans who could not afford to buy privatized enterprises or stock, real
wages fell steadily and income distribution worsened. Not only this, but because the
Chicago Boys-- who were educated under the Milton Friedman, the father of
conservative economic practices-- believed that the free market approach should be
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applied not only economically, but socially as well, social services were also privatized.
This included health care, education, and the pension system. Ultimately, these reforms
made it so that the level of quality in a person’s education, access to medical services, and
social security became directly correlated to the amount of money he or she was able to
pay. This created a vast difference in quality of life between the rich and poor since only
the rich had access to quality health care and education (Hecht 151).
Throughout the 1900s, Latin American countries’ economies were largely based
on raw materials, meaning that other countries were producing these materials and selling
finished products back to them. While exporting said raw materials was good for the
economy in that it kept people employed, peripheral countries like those of Latin America
ultimately began falling into serious debt. In 1982, the president of Mexico declared that
it would be unable to pay back its debts, sparking the worst recession Latin America had
seen since the Great Depression, throwing essentially every Latin American country into
economic disarray (Alcántara, Paramio, Freidenberg and Déniz 11). The crisis obviously
posed a threat to Pinochet’s regime, but “economic recuperation and greater attention to
the economic interests that were the core’s support, coupled with Pinochet’s political
intransigence and the continued use of repression” prevented a transition of power once
the economy crashed (Hecht 143). And, because the grand majority of Chile’s goods had
been privatized, unlike the rest of Latin America whose goods were national, Chile
survived the Lost Decade practically unscathed. Surviving the recession of the Lost
Decade along with how quickly he recuperated the economy after the Allende presidency
played a large part of Pinochet’s popularity and endurance as dictator over 17 years.
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However, it is important to mention the unthinkable human rights abuses that
happened during his regime. Operation Condor, led by Pinochet from 1973 to 1980, was
an international operation to stop communism by way of torture and assassination.
Countries in the Southern Cone-- Chile, Argentina and Uruguay-- were all involved, and
were supported by the United States; the goal was to “eradicate all traces of political
movements akin to Allende’s-- in all of Latin America” in order to stop the spread of
communism (Dinges 3). Political dissidents (i.e., Allende’s supporters and anyone who
identified as a leftist) were kidnapped, brought to detention centers, and were tortured or
killed by the government in a way that was a “very intense and relatively
undiscriminating use of violent repression” (Roniger and Sznajder 21). As mentioned by
the photo of Londrés 38 in Chapter One, many of the victims were members of MIR, a
Leftist organization, the Communist Party, and the Socialist Party-- but they were not the
only ones affected. Below are some demographics on torture victims:
Table 2.1: Victim Classification
Occupation

Percentage of Victims

Working Class

30.1

Student

14.2

Professional

11.6

Self-employed/misc.

25.5

Armed Forces

5.8

Table 2.2: Victims by Age
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Age Range

Percentage of Victims

Below 16

2.1

16-25

36.2

26-35

35

36-45

13.9

Over 46

9.4

Unknown

3.4

Source: US Institute of Peace

As made evident by the charts, no type of person was spared: There were students,
housewives, elderly people, and even members of the armed forces who were subject to
unspeakable violence. One torture victim who was a member of the Socialist Party,
Leopoldo García Lucero, shared his story with the Guardian shortly after the 40th
anniversary of the coup:
I was repeatedly tortured for months, first in the basement of a police
station, and then in the national stadium, which the military regime had
turned into a large concentration camp for political prisoners. I was
blindfolded and handcuffed for most of the torture, so I couldn't see my
torturers.
I was beaten on my head and body countless times; they broke my arm in
several places after smashing it with a rifle and I almost lost an eye; they
held my head under cold water and electrocuted me; they kicked me in my
testicles, burned me with cigarettes and suspended me by a hook with
weights on my legs. I heard of people being executed by firing squads.
At the police station, there were bags of concrete covered in blood. The
police interrogated me about the whereabouts of politicians close to
Allende; I wouldn't give them any information. They threatened to kill my
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six-year-old daughter. They said they would shoot her in front of the
concrete bags, and then do the same to me.
I didn't know if my family members were dead or alive for eight months. I
spent almost two years in several concentration camps. In June 1975, I
was expelled from Chile by a government decree. I received refugee status
in the UK, and my wife and three daughters joined me in exile. (Lucero 1)

Stories like Leopoldo’s are not uncommon. In 2011, the Valech Commission
reported that the newest total number of people who had been held as political prisoners
and tortured is 40,018 and the official number of those killed or forcibly disappeared is
now 3,065, while the unofficial numbers are probably much higher (Long 1). It is evident
from the tables above that many of the victims were young people-- typically students or
workers. Currently, anyone over just 25 years old was alive during his regime, and
therefore the memories of human rights violations like his are still fresh for many
Chileans.
By the late 1980’s, word had gotten out about the human rights abuses of the
Pinochet regime, so democratic countries and international human rights organizations
like Amnesty International began placing pressure on Chile to hold a plebiscite with the
hopes that Chileans would vote him out of office. After Pinochet was reelected in 1986 in
a similar plebiscite, forces to get him out of office strengthened. In 1988, 55% of the
population voted no, ending 17 years of authoritarian rule and finally commencing the
democracy Chile enjoys today.

Chile in Democracy: 1990 to Today
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One of the conditions of the plebiscite was that if voted out of office, Pinochet
would have two years to transition out. Therefore, in his final two years, he reformed the
constitution that he created in 1980 and constructed the binomial system under which
Chile governs itself today, which has created significant problems in Chilean politics. In
most countries in the world, a country is divided into districts, and each district has one
representative. This is not the case in Chile, where each district has two representatives,
and both seats are up for grabs by either party. In order for a party to take both seats in a
district, it must “gain more than twice the votes of the next most voted list,” which makes
it almost impossible for any one party to gain dominance (Angell 284). Because of this,
even if a party has a large following and high popular legitimacy, this same dominance is
not translated into the legislature. Because of this imbalance, parties have been forced to
band together for support and success. Though there are many parties within the country,
these parties have coalesced into two major blocs. These two blocs are known as the
Alianza, a center-right coalition, and the Concertación, a center-left coalition. While this
appears similar to the American two-party system, it creates less fair representation for
smaller parties within the coalitions. This system makes little sense for a democratic
society where all citizens are free to identify with whatever party they wish, but
Pinochet’s constitution reformers created a system that “overrepresent[ed] parties of the
Right and reduc[ed] the number of significant parties in the country” (Siavelis 58). This
fit perfectly into Pinochet’s goal to cripple the strength and number of all political parties,
since he was not affiliated with any one party himself. This electoral system profoundly
shapes party interactions in the country, and the central question scholars struggle over
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today concerns how “the coalitions have held together for so long” (Angell 285). Instead
of creating a healthy party system that expresses the needs of the people, the electoral
system has “consistently proven to be a stumbling block” in Chilean politics, and former
President Ricardo Lagos even said that it would be “the death of [Chile’s] democratic
system” (Pastor 56). In terms of popular protests, this means that an entire coalition
would have to be convinced that change is needed in order for protestors’ demands to be
met.
Despite the political system, Chile is still relatively politically stable. In fact,
when compared to other countries on the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index in terms of
democratic stability, Chile has a score of 42, a “stable” status in terms of their democracy
(Failed States Index 2013). The index measures factors such as economic decline, human
flight, delegitimization of the state, human rights abuses, education, and public services.
However, Chile is less stable than it was in 2006, before any of the student protests
began: It scored a 32, and its score has been declining ever since. However, when
comparing Chile to the rest of the world, a score of 42 is still very high, meaning that
overall, Chile has a very stable democracy.
Chile’s success as a politically stable country is, at least in part, due to the fact
that when Chile transitioned into democracy, the Concertación Coalition, who held the
power at the time, decided to make minimal changes to the policies already in place. This
was because they did not want to make any drastic changes for fear that the military
might see reason to intervene (Hecht 172). Therefore, the Constitution made in 1980 by
Pinochet himself was kept in place, and the unfair binomial system was kept in place and
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has yet to be changed (Siavelis 58). In other words, Pinochet’s grip on how Chile
functions politically and economically is still as tight as ever.
Before discussing what the Pinochet’s neoliberal legacy looks like within the
education system, though, it is important to frame where Chile lies within the rest of
Latin America in terms of social problems. With a human development index of roughly
0.8, Chile is among the most “developed” countries in Latin America (International
Human Development Indicators: Chile 2013). Furthermore, statistics show that Chile is
doing better than not only just Latin America, but than the world average. According to
the Human Development Index, Chile ranks at a .819, while the rest of Latin America
ranks at .741 and the world average is .694 (International Human Development
Indicators: Chile 2013). And because “very high human development” ranks at .905,
which factors in health, education, income, gender inequality, poverty, and so on, Chile is
indisputably a socially developed country. This does not mean that Chile is without
significant social problems, though.
At the end of the Pinochet regime in 1990, Chile had a GINI index of 0.58, where
0 is perfect equality and 1 is perfect inequality. Since then, the GINI index has fluctuated
some, but mostly remained between 0.57 and 0.58. As of 2012, it was only slightly better,
scoring at 0.52-- On par with the rest of Latin America (World Bank Database 1).
Additionally, the top ten percent of Chileans currently possess roughly 40% of the total
income in the country, and this unequal distribution has not gotten any better since the
fall of the Pinochet regime (Hecht 196). When comparing these statistics to the ones
above, it is clear that while Chile can be considered a socially developed country overall,
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the country still has significant issues with inequality (not unlike the United States, for
example). But ultimately, these statistics indicate that the unequal socio-economic
hierarchy that Pinochet created with his policies has largely remained in place, and
economic inequality is a pressing problem within the country. This is especially evident
when examining the country’s education system, which I will discuss in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE: Education and Protest

Chilean Education System
Before the dictatorship, Chile’s education system operated under the ideology of
estado docente, a teaching State, which meant that education was completely centralized:
In the late 1960s, primary education had been “practically universalized,” meaning it
either free or very cheap for students throughout the country (Delannoy 7). While Allende
was president, he sought to broaden educational opportunities and align them with
Marxist ideology, specifically by planning a revolution. However, Allende never achieved
this revolution-- or any sort of educational reform during his term-- due to all of his
administration’s aforementioned hardships.
However, after the coup d’état, the military government flipped estado docente on
its head by introducing a subsidiary role of government, meaning “the rights of private
agents ought to supersede the state’s prerogatives whenever possible,” which obviously
hand-in-hand with Pinochet and the Chicago Boys’ neoliberal ideology (Delannoy 8).
Specifically, the subsidiary education plan sought to “promote greater efficiency through
administrative decentralization, capitation-based financing, labor regulation and open
competition between public and privately administered schools” (Delannoy 1). This
meant that teachers were subject to private sector labor laws which allowed for local
determination of wages, schools were financed based on average monthly student

31

attendance, and parents had the choice to send their children to private schools if they
could pay, essentially privatizing everything. While the administration was successful in
completely privatizing the education system, it came at a price: overall quality of
education decreased drastically, and the poor were the hardest hit. Various evaluations
conducted in 1990 reflected that “40 percent of 4th graders in the poorest half of the
population could not understand what they were reading. . . [and] net secondary
enrollment ratios were 97.6 percent for the richest quintile, but only 73.6 percent for the
poorest quintile” (Delannoy 12). Today, vast economic inequality within the education
system still exists.
When a student enters school at age six, his/her parents are allowed to choose
which kind of school they would like their child to attend: municipal, state-funded (which
includes training schools like Professional Institutes (IPs) and Centers of Technical
Formation (CFTs)), or private. Municipal schools are funded by the municipalities
themselves; state-funded schools charge, but are less expensive than private schools. It is
generally acknowledged that the private schools are attended by the rich, state-funded
schools by the middle class, and municipal schools by the poorer students (Tertiary
Education in Chile 26). The graph below illustrates this trend:
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Source: Kathy Trabue via CNED Database
In order to enroll in any tertiary institution, students must take the standardized
admission exam called Prueba de Selección Universitária (PSU), much like the SAT in
the United States, which is the most important factor-- if not the only factor-- considered
for admission. In order to do well on the PSU, many well-to-do students choose to enroll
in pre-university schools after graduating high school in order to train for the test. While
private schools can normally successfully get through their curriculum before the school
year is over, leaving extra time for PSU training, municipal schools are typically unable
to sufficiently complete their curriculum by the end of the year, leaving less time for PSU
training. (This is reminiscent of state testing within the United States: More affluent
schools tend to do better on state tests because their teachers can more effectively teach
the curriculum and so they have more time to train students to take the test, whereas less
affluent schools do not have this advantage (Mackenzie 7).) One option for students to
make better scores on the test is to enroll in a year-long PSU training school, called a pre33

universitaria. However, it is not funded by municipalities or the state, meaning that
students who go to the lower-performing municipal schools likely cannot afford to enroll.
In the graph below, it is clear how much better students who go to private schools
perform on the PSU than those who go to municipal schools:

Source: Kathy Trabue via DEMRE
There are two types of universities that students can attend: Traditional and nontraditional. Traditional universities like the Catholic University of Chile and the Pontifical
Catholic University of Chile are members of the Council of Rectors of Chilean
Universities (CRUCH), which are state-funded, while non-traditional schools are private.
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(The university I attended was a CRUCH school.) CRUCH schools are historically
funded by the Catholic Church, but were privatized by the military government in 1981.
After 1990, the Concertación administration began partially funding them and allowed
for the creation of other private schools, but they are still more expensive than other
private universities. Today, CRUCH schools carry more prestige and are more selective
even though private and non-traditional schools offer the same types of degrees and are
roughly the same price. Below is a graph of prices for private and CRUCH schools versus
technical schools 4:

Source: Kathy Trabue via CNED Database
Interestingly, CRUCH schools also provide more access to funding for students,
yet cost about the same as non-traditional schools. According to the OECD,
the publicly-financed student support system consists of a number of
different loan and scholarship schemes… Though many of these schemes
are targeted specifically at young people from poorer households, their
4

There are roughly 500 CLP to 1 USD.
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PSU-dependency limits the numbers they can help. Secondly, most of the
schemes appear to have been designed with CRUCH institutions in mind,
and students at private universities, IPs and CFTs – two-thirds of tertiary
students– are far less likely to be eligible for them. (Tertiary Education in
Chile 43)

In other words, CRUCH schools offer more scholarships for students who are more
competitive-- meaning students who are wealthier-- than for the students who choose to
go to non-traditional schools or IPs and CFTs, which are attended by people with less
money than those who would attend CRUCH schools yet offer the same types of degrees.
In fact, in 2008, almost eighty percent of government-funded scholarship money went to
students attending CRUCH schools (Trabue 49).
One would assume that since the transition to democracy, politicians would have
swiftly changed this structure, as its faults were evident and it was so directly related with
the dictatorship. However, on his last day in office, March 10, 1990, Pinochet passed a
Constitutional Law on Education (LOCE), which was designed to “lock up” the
aforementioned education reforms by “making any amendment subject to a political
quorum, which was and remains largely unattainable” (Delannoy 13). While LOCE
served to perpetuate the neoliberal model within the education system, many people
believed that it was a “model for post-welfare reforms,” and so reversing them would
have required a “sustained and and difficult political fight with the opposition that the
Concertación would not want to risk” in such a fragile political state (Gauri 88). As
aforementioned, the Concertación coalition, while left-leaning, has kept many neoliberal
reforms in place, and LOCE was no different. It was not until massive student-led
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protests in 2006 when students demanded change that LOCE would finally come to an
end.

Student Protests
In a broader context, protests have proven to be a legitimate and effective way to
create change throughout Latin America. Due to rapid urbanization and democratization
within the last hundred years, some Latin American cities have turned into segregated
centers of rich and poor. In places like São Paulo, the poor have begun to do something
about it in what is known as insurgent citizenship. According to the anthropologist who
coined the term, James Holston, “city people live in impoverished urban peripheries in
various conditions of illegal and irregular residence, around urban centers that benefit
from their services and their poverty. . . Precisely in these peripheries, residents organize
movements of insurgent citizenship to confront the entrenched regimes of citizen
inequality that the urban centers use to segregate them” (Holston 245). Movements of
insurgent citizenship can have the goal of gaining the “right to reside with dignity,
security, and mobility,” and often take the form of protests and violence (Holston 248).
The people living in the favelas of São Paulo have seen significant gains in rights since
they began to use violence as a means of voicing their needs, and large cities in Chile like
Santiago and Valparaíso are no different: Citizens are using violence and protests in order
to create important and necessary social change.
Some of the more well-known protests in Chile include the 2011 peaceful protests
where the indigenous Mapuches of Patagonia rode into Punta Arenas on horseback to
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object the construction of a dam in Patagonia which would destroy their livelihoods (and,
not to mention, the environment, which was protested by people in Santiago that year as
well), and of course, the 2011 student protests, which were particularly violent. In these
instances, insurgent citizenship was practiced in that marginalized groups like the
Mapuches and students came together in a public setting to voice their demands.
However, protests have become such an effective manner of communicating that it is not
just marginalized groups protesting, but rather, Chileans of different socio-economic
groups have come together in solidarity. In my four months in Chile alone, I witnessed
countless protests for a plethora of different causes, ranging from workers rights on Labor
Day to the legalization of marijuana, from LGBT rights to the objection of a mall that is
to be built in a historic part of Valparaíso; each protest included people from many
different socio-economic groups. In retrospect, it is unsurprising that the CRUCH
university I attended shut down: Even though I went to a traditionally rich school with
privileged students who didn’t necessarily need free education or more state funding to
attend a good university, the students still voted for their school to go en paro. Because
rich students would have no other incentive to vote this way as they are the ones
receiving all the benefits of this unequal system, voting to go en paro was likely just so
that their poorer counterparts might have the opportunity to attend better schools, which
is an impressive and important act of solidarity.
June 2006 marked the first major student protest in the country and the largest in
Chile’s history up to that point, with over a million students rioting for over ten hours in
Santiago (Franklin 1). Concerns about the education system had been voiced since the
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transition to democracy, but a new fee for the PSU and rumors that public transportation
benefits for students would be cut off sent students to the streets to protest. Students
demanded that they receive free public transportation to and from school, waivers for the
fee to take the PSU, the placement of students on the presidential advisory committee, the
end of LOCE, and ultimately, quality education for all (Riesco 244). The protest, which
became known as the March of the Penguins (in reference to the black and white student
uniforms everyone wore) was largely successful in that LOCE was abolished and was
replaced with the General Law of Education 5 which limits the authority that universities
have from discriminating against students for economic reasons, but the demand for
better education for everyone was still not met.

5

Ley General de Educación
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Students rioting in front of PUCV in Valparaiso
Photo by Eliseo Fernandez

!

In 2011, student protests escalated to an extent that was more organized and more

violent than in 2006. Some people I spoke with in Chile believed that the students who
led the 2006 secondary school-oriented protests were the same people who led the 2011
university-oriented protests, but others claimed that the rise in massive protests in 2011
were inspired by similar student protests in Spain as well as the Arab Spring-- the reason
protests escalated in 2011 is likely a combination of the two. Either way, there were
countless, massive protests throughout the country that quickly became violent among
both protesters and the police: One student, Manuel Gutiérrez Reinoso, was shot and
killed by the police (Chilean president seeks answers on protest death 1). The Atlantic
created a photo album to capture the essence of the protests. The photo above in
particular caught my attention, not only because of its location (directly in front of my
university, PUCV), but because of the students wearing gas masks and throwing stones at
what is most certainly the police.
While there was lots of violence involved in the 2011 protests, as this photograph
effectively displays, the student movement did not lack organization. Prominent leaders
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such as Giorgio Jackson, president of a prominent organization called the Federation of
Students of the University of Chile (FEUC) that organizes and mobilizes students at the
University of Chile, and Camila Vallejo, president of a similar organization for students at
multiple universities called the Federation of Chilean Students (FECh), quickly became
prominent leaders and spokespeople for the student protests. Together, they also led an
even broader, more mobile organization called CONFECH, the Confederation of Chilean
Students,6 which published a definitive list of demands in July of 2011. The list included
sweeping educational reform, not only for tertiary education but for primary and
secondary as well. Some of the demands included constitutional reform, less emphasis on
the PSU for university admission, increased state support for public universities,
dismunicipalization of public schools, free public transport for students, a new system for
scholarships and student financing, student participation in university governance, a new
system for accreditation, and increased state support for public universities (Bases para
un acuerdo social por la educación chilena 1). On the first of August, the then-president
Sebastián Piñera responded with a proposal that would increase scholarships and allow
student participation in university governance, but would still allow for schools to be forprofit (Salazar 1). Unsurprisingly, CONFECH rejected his proposal, and through
Facebook, Twitter, its blog, and flyers and posters in universities, it organized massive
protests throughout the country for August 5th (Franklin 1).
Because of protests like that, which have been happening semi-consistently from
2011 until today, reforms like waived entrance exam fees, reduced-cost student

6

Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile
41

transportation, and even a replacement of LOCE have been implemented, which
abolished for-profit schools (Setterfield 1). In other words, the protests have made
significant progress in changing the education system. However, many critics argue that
this progress is not long-term enough: reforms made only put a bandaid on the bullet
hole, and LOCE’s replacement has been essentially useless because it has done so little to
constrain market forces. However, in June of 2013, Bachelet, who was running for
reelection at the time, promised that if she were president, she would make education free
for all within six years (Ahumada 1). This is a significantly different stance on education,
considering she did relatively little when she was president in 2006. I even remember
graffiti outside of PUCV that said that voting for Bachelet would be like returning to an
ex-partner after he or she had cheated, but with much more graphic vocabulary. However,
her 2013 election platform was to establish education as a “social right,” creating
“explicit guarantees to access, quality, and financing,” and she was indeed reelected
(Arzola 1). If she will follow through with promise, though, is something that has yet to
unfold.

2013 Presidential Elections
In the 2013 elections, Michele Bachelet of the Nueva Mayoría Coalition (formerly
Concertación-- it now includes the Communist Party) and Evelyn Matthei of the Alianza
Coalition faced a runoff as neither candidate gained over 50% of the vote in the general
elections, which is necessary to win the presidency. Bachelet gained 47% of the vote
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while Matthei only gained 25%, and in the runoff, Bachelet won with 62.3% of the vote
(Presidency Postponed 1).
This election demonstrated an interesting dialogue between the past and present in
terms of politics. In a survey done by the Center for Public Studies in September 2013,
people associated Michelle Bachelet with the left and Matthei very much to the right
(Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública 93). Interestingly, each candidate had a powerful
connection with the Pinochet dictatorship: Bachelet herself was interrogated and tortured
by the Pinochet government because she was a Socialist (and still is), while Matthei’s
father was a military general during the dictatorship (Modiano 1). This information, while
not the most important aspect of the election, was widely discussed in various media
outlets as well as among my Chileans friends and host family, and everyone discussed
how their personal histories represent how much the politics of the dictatorship is still
prevalent in Chilean politics. Because of the certain parallel between the politics of 1973
and the 2013 elections, Bachelet’s win was perceived as a metaphorical victory. In this
case, Allende was ultimately triumphant against Pinochet in the long run, working to end
Pinochet’s legacy that was called to die in the protest poster I mentioned in the first
chapter. Themes of metaphorical victory like this are recurrent in the Chilean public; I
will discuss them further in the chapters to come because they make strong arguments
that Chileans want to disassociate from Pinochet and what he represents.
Another important aspect of the 2013 presidential election was that some of the
student movement’s most important student leaders, like Camila Vallejo, Giorgio
Jackson, Karol Cariola and Gabriel Boric, were all elected to congress. When asked about
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what she wanted to do in office, Vallejo responded, “We want to interrupt the institution
in order to change it, because it is antidemocratic in many respects. It has many enclaves
that have persisted since the military dictatorship until today. The grand majority of
people understand that Chile has changed. . . And also the more traditional political
world, that has realized that there is a new political moment that requires structural
changes7” (Los exlíderes estudiantiles que arrasaron en las elecciones en Chile 1). Some
of her most important priorities in office include drafting a new constitution,
strengthening social and worker’s rights, and, of course, reforming education. While
some Chileans think joining the traditional political realm and teaming up with Bachelet,
who did little to implement educational reform in her first term, is hypocritical, having
young people insert themselves into office is an important step for young Chileans to
actively achieve their political agenda in another way than through simply protest. Again,
whether or not Vallejo and the other student leaders actually make a difference is a
question that cannot yet be answered, but their newfound presence in the government is
an important step for the youngest generation of Chileans, whose ideals will be explored
further in the following chapters.

7

Queremos irrumpir en la institucionalidad para cambiarla, porque es antidemocrática en muchos aspectos.
Tiene enclaves que persisten desde la dictadura militar hasta el momento. Hay una gran mayoría que
entendió que Chile cambió. . . También el mundo político más tradicional, que se dio cuenta que hay un
nuevo momento político que requiere cambios estructurales.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Displays of Public Memory in Chile
Since the transition to democracy and especially within the student movement,
many Chileans have expressed their feelings about the dictatorship in the form of
memorials, music, artwork, theater, and public spectacle. As mentioned in the first
chapter, public memory is a tool that ultimately attempts to mold the future of society by
making statements about the past; it is a way to understand how a culture attempts to
understand itself from a historical perspective. People can create public memory to reflect
upon past events, which will ideally influence those who view it to believe what the
creators want the viewers to believe about the historical event and be changed by it.
Therefore, displays of public memory in Chile regarding the dictatorship are extremely
important because they make a statement about how Chileans envision the past and, in
turn, the future of Chile. Of course, this is the same goal as the student protesters, who
want to improve their education system and move past the policies of the dictatorship.
This becomes even more important when the age of the memory creators is considered:
Younger people tend to have more sway when making political statements because their
vote is so important, so if a group of young people unites against something, this will
make an impact on society and affect its future. Therefore, when one considers that many
young artists and musicians who have been leaders in the student movement have also
explored themes of the dictatorship-- and that those two themes tend to run together in
displays of public memory, as I will explore below-- one can argue that the student
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protests are just as much about making educational reform as they are about making a
statement about Chilean history and how they want to redefine it. This is what I will
investigate in this chapter in order to ultimately understand the relationship between
public memory, Pinochet, and education reform.
I must mention that while there are surely hundreds of signs, symbols, songs,
movies, paintings and so on used during student protests that have pointed blame at
Pinochet for the problems in today’s education system, I do not have access to more of
them for obvious reasons. However, the examples given below clearly demonstrate that
students and leaders of the movement believe that the source of the problem in the
education system is Pinochet, and are fearlessly willing to make a stand to change how he
is remembered.

Music
Music is an invaluable medium for the creation of public memory. According to
the Ethnomusicology Forum, “Music-making and subsequent recollections of the musical
experience bridge the divide between individual and collective memory. . . Music is
valued as an experience that joins individuals with a group. Music as at once the outcome
of individual creativity and creativity’s grounding as a social act” (Shelemay 22-23). In
other words, music creates a relationship between listeners and an idea-- in this instance,
a historical event-- which then makes an impact on the listener’s perspective of that idea.
Therefore, music is an important tool for group identity formation. In the case of Chile,
musicians form group identity through songs about both the dictatorship and the student
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protests, uniting students simultaneously in their discontent for the dictatorship and their
demand for education reform.
Ana Tijoux is one of the most up-and-coming Latin American artists from Chile,
having been nominated for best Latin American rock albums in both 2009 and 2011. Her
first album, “1977,” and her second album, “La Bala,” both have strong undertones of
political activism in regards to both the education movement and to the dictatorship.
According to the Los Angeles Times, who did an interview with the artist,
“Tijoux's . . ."La Bala" (The Bullet), released in January [2011] in the United States, gave
a sympathetic shout-out to Chile's recent wave of youth-led street protests demanding
education reforms and attacking the country's growing gulf between rich and poor.
‘1977’ alluded to Tijoux's generation of Chileans whose parents had fled the brutal 17year regime of Gen. Augusto Pinochet and had gone into European exile”” (Johnson 1). It
is important to note that Tijoux herself was a refugee in France until the dictatorship
ended when she was fourteen because her parents were leftist activists. Her experience as
a young victim of the dictatorship makes her a credible activist, and ultimately enhances
her clout as a leader in the student movement because rhetoric between the two is so
intertwined.
Her most famous song, “Shock,” was released in 2011 at the height of the student
protests and quickly became the anthem for the student movement. In the song, Tijoux
addresses a leader, presumably President Piñera, when she says, “Your state of control /
your corrupt throne of gold / your politics and your wealth.” The chorus of the song is
essentially a cry to battle, making demands that the “stealing” stops now, which is in
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obvious reference to the education system as images of the 2011 protests flash during her
music video. Further, “this condemned economic model from dinosaur times” that she
critiques is an obvious reference to the Neoliberal economic model that political leaders
like Piñera, Bachelet, and every democratic president have upheld since the transition to
democracy, and she also blatantly references the constitution created by Pinochet as one
of the many problems that should be risen up against. The music video is equally
polemic: There are images of Chilean leaders contrasted with images of students
violently protesting. Because the height of its popularity was during the height of the
protests, this song represented, validated, and encouraged the emotions of the students in
the education movement, making it one of the most iconic and important songs of the
year.
Most importantly, the platform from which the artist makes her stance is not from
that of a student-- because she is not one-- but of a Chilean who was victimized by the
dictatorship. As mentioned above, the title of her whole record, “1977,” is a tribute to
those who are her age, born in the heat of the dictatorship. Because public memory is
defined as a way to remember the past in order to make an argument about the present
and the future, her entire album, her protest song, and ultimately her image, are all a
display of public memory. Therefore, there is a significant link between her work as a
leader in the student movement and public memory of the dictatorship that has important
implications: Because of her platform, high school and college students listen to her
music as a source of inspiration for their cause, and she is thus inscribing public memory
onto them about what happened in the past as well as what Chile is today. Tijoux sends
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the message that Chile has a dark past that needs to be revolutionized.
While Ana Tijoux is certainly the pronounced artist of the student protests, there
are other bands that have had an impact on the movement. In the “CultPop” section of El
Dínamo, an independent Chilean news source, a list of influential songs was published
that were said to represent the student movement in 2011. While some classic resistance
songs like “Freedom” by Rage Against the Machine and “Revolution” by the Beatles
made the list, there were multiple Chilean artists who are most widely known for their
work during the dictatorship. Víctor Jara, an immortalized Chilean musician from the
1960’s, is one poignant example: A member of the Communist Party and part of the New
Chilean Song Movement,8 a musical movement that consisted of a group of left-leaning
artists during Allende’s time who sang for peace and social justice, Jara was a famous
theater director, singer-songwriter, poet and activist under the Allende administration.
Unsurprisingly, he was tortured and killed by the Pinochet government shortly after the
coup. According to El Dínamo, “the Chilean composer concurs with university students
and their desires to change the Chilean education system. He was captured by the military
regime, his hands were smashed and he was later killed, but his legacy remains intact.
There are men who death can’t even silence” (Carrasco 1). 9 The author of the web article
intentionally highlights Jara’s tragic relationship to the military dictatorship while
discussing the student movement and makes the argument that he and the students
fighting for change have the same dream. This is a clear example of the type of
8

Movimiento de la Nueva Canción Chilena

9

el compositor chileno se cuadra con los estudiantes universitarios y sus deseos de cambiar el sistema
educativo chileno. Fue apresado por el régimen militar, sus manos destrozadas y luego asesinado, pero su
legado está intacto. Hay hombres a los que la muerte no puede hacer callar.
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relationship that Chilean activists believe the dictatorship has with the current education
movement.
Another important band that the article mentions is called Los Prisioneros. While
not part of the New Chilean Song Movement, this band became famous during the
dictatorship for their social commentary, even though music was censored. Los
Prisioneros became popular in the early 1980’s for its social critiques on things like
machismo, but once the dictatorship was over, its turned to political critique. According
to the article, their song “El baile de los que sobran,” which came out in 1986, is “perhaps
the most important song to the student movement. [The band members] were against the
Chilean education system and this song, which is over 25 years old, denounces it,
remaining current today. One of the eloquent verses: ‘They said the truth to others, that
thing called education10’” (Carrasco 1). In the eyes of Chilean protesters, the band whose
message was repressed during the dictatorship carries the same message today, which
validates their frustration and motivates social change. This is the same case as Ana
Tijoux and Víctor Jara: The band’s platform is their experience with and stance against
the dictatorship, yet their singles are considered quintessential anthems of the 2011
student protests-- evidence that rhetoric about the dictatorship and the student movement
is constantly being intertwined, and students are receptive to it.

Art

10

Es tal vez la canción más contingente al movimiento estudiantil. González, Narea y Tapia se fueron en
picada contra el sistema educativo chileno y esta canción de más de 25 años de antigüedad así lo denuncia,
manteniéndose vigente hasta el día de hoy. Una de las frases es decidora: “A otros dieron de verdad, ésa
cosa llamada educación”.
l
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One of the most prominent displays of memory I encountered in my time abroad
was the movie No, directed by Pablo Larraín, which came out in 2012 and ultimately won
an Oscar. The movie takes place in the late 1988, just before the plebiscite, where Gael
García Bernal plays the creative director of an advertisement campaign for Chileans to
vote against another two years of Pinochet in office. Stylistically, the film takes form of a
documentary, where it is shot to match the film quality of the era. Much of the film uses
real footage of not only the No commercial itself, but of protests and unrest that took
place during the time as well. The campaign in the movie frequently references the NO+
campaign of 1983. This was a real art project created by Chile’s most influential artists,
including Lotty Rosenfield, Diamela Eltit, Raúl Zurita, Juan Castillo an Fernando
Balcells, who banned together to form a group called the Collective Actions of Art 11
(CADA), which used performance to challenge their country’s politics. On the ballot of
the plebiscite, voters were to make a vertical line down a horizontal line next to either Yes
-- or No --, making a + formation. In Spanish, the + sign means más, meaning both ‘plus’
and ‘more,’ making the NO+ mean ‘no more.’ “Wall tagging was the first form of NO+,
but the slogan was soon used by different collectives all over the country as a massive
public symbol of political resistance and non-conformity” (NO+ 1983-Present 1).
The use of NO+ became an important symbol leading up to the plebiscite, and
although the movie does not directly address CADA as a group, their project was
obviously an important contribution to the recent film because of its influence at the time
and therefore to public memory of Chile. The movie is also about the making of the No

11

Colectivo de Acciones de Arte
li

52

campaign song, “La Alegría Ya Viene,” which means “Happiness is Coming.” All the
while, the campaign director, played by Gael García Bernal, is a doubtful Chilean who
does not think that Chileans will vote Pinochet out of office yet receives threats from the
government due to his work. The end of the film shows the massive, exuberant
celebration of the plebiscite’s results and casts a message of positivity and hope for the
future of Chile.
While the No campaign song itself is so upbeat and catchy that every older
Chilean I spoke to told me that they still remembered all the words, it was a common
saying among them that la alegría nunca llegó, or happiness of democracy promised
during the plebiscite never came. This opinion is embodied perfectly by an op-ed
journalist at El Ciudadano when talking about the film:
No won, but instead of changing the Pinochet constitution,
Concertación governed and legitimized it. No won, but the breach between
rich and poor is still one of the most unequal in the world. . . No won, but
education, health, precaution, highways and basic services are all still in
private hands today which have indebted and isolated us Chileans. [. . .]
And even though in 1988 No won, in 2012 nothing has really
changed. The famous “happiness” never arrived. But what did arrive was a
pile of material goods, microwaves, televisions, loan sharks,
pharmaceutical and retail collusions, trash television, and a profound
cultural shallowness that has spiritually impoverished and isolated us.12
(Sánchez 1)
12

Ganó el NO pero en lugar de cambiar la constitución de Pinochet, la Concertación gobernó con
ella y la legitimó. Ganó el NO pero la brecha entre ricos y pobres se mantiene como una de las
más desiguales del mundo. . . .Ganó el NO y la educación, la salud, la previsión, las carreteras y
los servicios básicos permanecen hasta el día de hoy en manos de privados que tienen endeudados
y alienados a los chilenos. [. . .]
Y pese a que en 1988 haya ganado el “NO”, en el 2012 las cosas no han cambiado tanto. La
famosa alegría nunca llegó. Sí llegó un montón de bienes materiales, microondas, televisores y
autos último modelo. Pero llegaron de la mano de las deudas, los créditos usureros, las colusiones
de farmacias y retail, la televisión basura y una profunda chatura cultural que hoy nos tiene
empobrecidos y extraviados espiritualmente.
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Sánchez obviously has a very negative perception of Chile’s current state. The
film attempts to glorify the transition to democracy as an amazing achievement, but the
journalist notes that upon the release of the film, the Chilean government made no
comment that there was still work to be done in regards to Pinochet’s remaining
constitution and economic model and instead took pride in Chile’s positive image from
the film. It is also important to note that the Chilean education system was listed as one of
the things still wrong with Chile in the context of the public memory of the dictatorship-To the journalist, education is a major problem that is worth mentioning in the context of
No.
This is what another blogger had to say:
Larraín intermediates the surface of history, so the. . . format [of the
movie]matches the skin of a history that is still being told, a fiction story
that unites with archive material and varnishes-- trivializes-- the collective
memories that get confused with history or conform to history. At the
same time, it is interesting that the Yes and No campaigns are what
construct the tension of the film-- images already seen, already forgotten-and come to propel a discussion that was once unpresentable. That current
democracy is a product of marketing strategy. (Urrutia 1).13
Urrutia makes the argument that there is an interplay between the time period of
the movie and current day which is found both through the style of filming and suspense
of not knowing the outcome of something that’s already happened. She believes that this

Larraín interviene la superficie de la historia, por eso el formato Umatic que permite igualar la
piel de una historia que aún se está contando, un relato de ficción que se reúne con el material de
archivo y va barnizando –banalizando- las memorias colectivas que se confunden con la historia o
que conforman la historia. Por lo mismo, es interesante que las campañas del SI y del NO sean las
que construyen la tensión del filme, imágenes –ya vistas, ya olvidadas-, las que llegan para
proponer un discurso –otrora- impresentable. Que la actual democracia es producto de una
estrategia de marketing.
13
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ultimately means that the film argues that Chile’s current democracy, like the No
campaign, is something that is simply being constructed by the hands of a private
enterprise, which has been a recurring critique of the film (Khazan 1). Both bloggers
believe that Chile’s transition to democracy has been a failure because of the
government’s resistance to change. And for both of them, the conversation about the
movie is important and necessary, which is exactly the desired result of a display of
public memory: To cause the viewer to reflect on the display’s argument and to establish
their own opinion, whether or not it is alignment with the display’s.
In the survey I administered to Chileans (upon which I will expound in the next
chapter), I asked whether the respondents had seen this movie and whether or not they
planned to in the future, and I received some interesting responses. Out of the 24
respondents, only half said they had seen it. Most of the people who said they had seen it
didn’t give any response, but those who said no I had some interesting responses as to
why:
“I haven’t seen it, I don’t plan to see it, it’s a difficult history to remember.”14
“I’m not interested in seeing it, in Chile it incites too much to look into the past
and I
think this movie only generates more division.”15
“No, eventually. But I think this movie didn’t generate the same effect as
Machuca when
it came out, that which made public and massive the theme of social differences
that are

14

“No la he visto, no pienso verla, es una historia pasada dificil de recordar”

15

“No, no me interesa verla, en chile se fomenta demaciado mirar el pasado y esta pelicula solo creo que
genera más división”
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behind today’s political problems.”16
“Yes and no, I started to watch but got bored, I didn’t find that it represented what
really
happened in the country.”17
“I’m not interested in watching Gael García Bernal try to talk like a Chilean. Also
Chilean cinema is too politicized.”18

As we can see, this movie been received in a myriad of ways. These respondents
think that the film is too political and have chosen not to engage with this form of public
memory, while some of the others who took the survey thought it was a well-made,
important movie. I found some similar pushback when asked about another new form of
public memory: The Museo de la Memoria discussed in the first chapter. When asked
about whether or not they had been to the Memory Museum, a brand new, state-of-the-art
museum in Santiago that focuses on the dictatorship, only seven people said they had,
and only one student was of that seven. While multiple people said it was too far away
from Valparaíso (a two hour drive) and almost everyone said that they did want to go in
the future, I also had some interesting responses as to why people didn’t want to go:
“No, I haven’t thought to go, but I think it’s necessary that it exists.”19

16

“No, eventualmente. Pero considero que esa película no generó el mismo efecto que Machuca cuando se
estrenó, la que hizo público y masivo el tema de las diferencias sociales que está detrás de los problemas
políticos aquella época y esta.”
17

“Sí y no, la empecé a ver pero me aburrió, no encontré que representara lo que sucedía realmente en el
país.”
18

“No, no me interesa ver a Gael García Bernal intentando hablar como chileno. Además el cine chileno
está demasiado politizado.”
19

“No, no me ha llamado la atención ir, pero encuentro necesario de que este exista.”
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“No, one day maybe, but I think that it’s necessary to look towards the future and
not keep ourselves in the past, filling ourselves with resentment.”20
“No, maybe, I think they abuse the theme of the disappeared detainees and human
rights. Man does have rights and also should have duties and the Museum doesn’t
mention that nor does it mention those in uniform who died at the hand of the UP
guerrillas.”21

The first response was something I found to be very typical of most of the
respondents: There was an appreciation that it was there, but they did not show interest in
making the trip to Santiago like I did while I was there. The third response was from the
person who approved of Pinochet, who is biggest outlier in the survey. The mixed
responses about not wanting to watch the “too politicized” movies or go to the museum
were surprising at first, but on a deeper level, this resistance indicates an initiative to
move forward into the future and not spend time dwelling on their country’s dark past.
While going to the museums, watching the movies and learning the history of the
dictatorship was extremely important to me as a foreigner who was trying to understand
the country’s history and culture, experiencing those things was very jarring-- jarring
enough for me to write my thesis on it. It is understandable, then, why a Chilean would
think that it was good that those forms of public memory exist, but they would not
necessarily go out of their way to see them.
Public Memory in Protests
While I have focused mainly on Chile’s student protests, as I mentioned in the
“No, algún día quizás, pero creo que es necesario mirar hacia el futuro y no quedarnos pegados en el
pasado, llenándonos de rencor.”
20

“No, tal vez, siento que abusan del tema de los detenidos desaparecidos, al igual que de los DD.HH. El
hombre si tiene derechos también debe tener deberes y el Museo no lo menciona, como tampoco lo hace
por aquellos uniformados que murieron en mano de los guerrilleros de la UP”
21
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first chapter, Chileans have begun protesting everything-- Malls, taxes, electric plants.
2013 marked the 40th anniversary of the coup d’état, and something interesting
happened: In a rally for presidential candidate Marco Enríquez Ominami, Slate Magazine
reports this scene:
“We’re going to make history today!” says the MC, a heavyset hype-man
in an orange hoodie, as Latin rock pumps through the northeast corner of
the Plaza de Armas. “A thousand people in Allende’s glasses! Yeah!”
Campaign workers leave the stage with cardboard boxes full of imitation
glasses—plastic lenses in the same kind of chunky black frames that the
Chilean president wore up until the day he killed himself in the
presidential palace as Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s forces bombed the
building. The crowd, several thousands strong, surges against the
barricades to grab the glasses.
Amid a spike in Salvador Allende’s popularity, particularly among
younger Chileans, those glasses are icons—stenciled on sidewalks, printed
on T-shirts, the inspiration for songs like “Allende’s Glasses” by Manuel
García. And in the midst of a heated presidential campaign that just
happens to fall on the 40th anniversary of Allende’s death, one could be
mistaken for thinking that Allende himself was on the ballot. (Thornburgh
1)
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Students play by a giant replica of Allende’s broken glasses
Source: Salvador-Allende.cl
Along with this rally, a giant replica of Allende’s glasses as they were found after
the bombing were displayed outside of La Moneda for the anniversary of the coup.
Above, children are photographed with the glasses, wearing matching T shirts that honor
his memory.
These displays of public memory represent a paradigm shift in perception about
Chilean history. On the 40th anniversary of the commencement of Pinochet’s regime, it is
not Pinochet who is being celebrated like he probably was during the dictatorship-Rather, the celebration is for the leader who was technically defeated that day in 1973.
While the anniversary activity mentioned above was not necessarily a protest, it was a
public display of memory that students like the ones photographed above did attend,
which makes a statement about how teachers want that historical event to be
remembered.
As for the student protests themselves, memories of the dictatorship can be found
openly in signs and artwork, demonstrating a certain relationship. One example is of a
photo below of two protestors: One woman holds up a sign that says “Students teach us
to be valiant” while the other’s says “Pinochet: Death to your Legacy,” a very similar
lviii
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tagline as the photo I found of a protest sign in the Londrés 38 museum as discussed in
Chapter 1. This protest took place in June of 2013 in Santiago, which was the most recent
large protest. The word choice used in the first poster invokes strength and bravery of
students while the second invokes death of Pinochet. Because these two protestors likely
know each other (by the fact that they are standing and posing together for the picture),
this indicates that to them, there is indeed a relationship between the student movement
and the legacy of Pinochet. There is an intentional juxtaposition between the strength and
death to argue that there is something to be learned from the students who are striving to
kill Pinochet’s legacy. Obviously, this type of public memory makes a very specific
argument about how Pinochet should be remembered.
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Women protesting in Santiago
Photo by Shirley Coenen
Another example of the presence of Pinochet in the student protests is when a
group of artists called Colectivo Casagrande, famous for their projects involving political
statements, created a 10 x 4 meter, inflatable, King Kong-esque Pinochet and put it in
front of the University of Chile in November 2012. Besides Pinochet hangs a sign that
reads “170 years: The University of Chile United in the Strengthening of Public
Education as a Right for a More Just Society.” According to the article posted about it,
the inflatable figure served to “threaten public education,” which ultimately makes the
argument that Pinochet was not a leader who believed in a “more just society” through
education as the sign next to him suggests (Foto 1). Furthermore, this caricature of
Pinochet does not actually invoke fear: King Kong is typically viewed as an antiquated
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monster who fails to actually scare anyone anymore. The artists essentially argue that
Pinochet’s education policies, while still present in the education system, should no
longer affect education policy because they are, like King Kong, antiquated and
diminished in power.

Pinochet as King Kong outside of La Universidad de Chile
Source: El Mostrador

In April 2012, there was another protest in Santiago reported on by Aporrea, a
Venezuelan news source that publishes articles on social issues in Latin America. In the
photo they used to report on the protests, a college-aged girl is holding a sign that reads
“Piñera = Pinochet. Education for the people, but quality education” (Primera de 2012 1).
This student clearly believes that Piñera, the president at the time, was just like Pinochet
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in that he was not providing quality education for rural Chileans. This poster is a call to
action for students to get rid of Piñera, and therefore to get rid of the rest of Pinochet’s
legacy, in order to achieve the goals of the student movement.
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Girl holding a protest sign
Source: Aporrea.org

Conclusion
In all of the examples of public memory mentioned above that were part of
various protests within the last three years, it is clear that students and leaders of the
education movement believe that Pinochet’s remaining policies are what is wrong with
the current education system, and they are fearlessly willing to make a stand to change
how he is remembered. This lack of inhibition to protest and speak out against Pinochet,
despite his lingering popularity and policies, is indicative that perceptions of Pinochet are
changing: Images of him that are associated with things like King Kong, violence, and
corrupt politics are all displays of public memory that argue that his legacy is not one of
prestige like he probably would have wanted, but rather, his counterpart Allende is being
celebrated as the winner of the last 40 years. Public memories of Allende are more and
more positive as Pinochet’s are more and more negative. This bombardment of negative
imagery upon the public has polarized Chileans, and the youngest adult generation is
proven to be not only the group who is perpetuating it, but they are highly receptive to it,
as made evident by the results of the 2013 presidential election and their active
participation in the student protests of 2013. Their beliefs about the past will ultimately
affect future social and economic policies in Chile as the youngest generation becomes
political and social leaders, which will greatly reshape Chile’s future as a democratic
nation. To further my argument that displays of memory like the ones in this chapter do
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indeed make an impact on Chile’s youngest generation, my next chapter provides
statistical evidence that young Chileans feel worse about Pinochet than older generations.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Measuring Generational Feelings towards Pinochet

In order to evaluate generational shifts in thinking about Pinochet as well as some
of the other indicators of change in public memory, I decided to create a survey that
asked questions that might help me gauge how people were feeling. The survey did not
gain much traction-- I only had 24 respondents-- but the results are useful and insightful
in terms of giving a snapshot of how Chileans feel about their past, especially among
college students. In order to supplement my own results, I also found a survey done by a
Chilean survey group that asked similar questions to a larger sample size. I will first
discuss my results and then compare them to the larger survey in order to make an
argument about generational change in perception of Pinochet, and then apply my
findings to my discussion about protest and public memory.

Methodology
I decided to use SurveyMonkey to administer my surveys to Chileans. The
surveys were in Spanish and shared through Facebook. I asked my friends to post the
survey on their Facebook pages and to share it with their friends and family so I could get
a wide distribution of respondents of all ages. I also emailed my professors and asked
them to take the surveys and share them.
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While my sample size was small, my aim was not to find statistical significance,
but rather to get a snapshot of ideas, which proved effective because of the amount of
response I received from university students. 24 people responded to the survey; of them,
17 were students and 7 were not. Everyone who took the survey who was between 18-24
was a student. There were 5 respondents who were between 25 and 49, and two
respondents who were 50 and older. In other words, 70% of the respondents were in the
first generational age group, 28% were in the second age group, and only 8% were in the
third age group as defined by my first chapter. This is how they responded:

I chose to organize this chart by age, going from youngest to oldest, in order to
see any trends that might emerge in the questions. The different colors in the chart range
from lowest numbers being the most red with the highest numbers being most green to
show level of intensity in certain responses. While the rest of the survey questions are
listed in the appendix, the most important questions I asked are listed on the graph below
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as Q1-Q5, which were statements that they rated from 1-10 in how much they agreed
with it. For the sake of clarity, I will list them here: Q1 was “Pinochet’s economic
policies benefitted Chile in the 1970s and 1980s”; Q2 was “The economic policies were
successful in transforming Chile into the stable country it is today”; Q3 was “Pinochet’s
social policies were beneficial for Chilean society during the 1970s and 80s”; Q4 was
“Pinochet’s social policies still influence social policies today”; Q5 was “General opinion
about Pinochet.” The scale goes from 1 as strongly disagree to 10 as strongly agree. From
here, it was easy to see certain trends.

Age Trends
The students between 19 and 21 answered questions in the same way consistently.
They believed that Pinochet’s economic policies did not benefit Chile during the 1970s
and 1980s and they were not successful in transforming Chile into the country it is today,
Pinochet’s social policies were not beneficial for Chile but still affect Chile’s social
policies today, and they all very strongly disliked Pinochet.
Students between 22 and 24, however, had different answers. Question 1,
regarding whether or not Pinochet’s economic policies benefitted Chile during the
dictatorship, was answered with answers ranging from 5 to 8-- a sharp contrast between
the 1’s and 3’s that the 19-21 year-olds responded with. They also answered question 2
with mostly 7’s, whereas the highest ranking the 19-21 year-olds ranked it 5 and under
with mostly 1’s. They also believed that Pinochet’s social policies still affect today’s
social policies in number 4, but not as much as the 19-21 year olds, who almost
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exclusively answered with 10’s. Instead, there were only two 10’s, three 7’s and one 5. In
the last question about feelings towards Pinochet in general, only one person answered
with a 1 (whereas everyone but one person answered with a 1 in the younger group), and
one person even responded with an 8, meaning they rather liked him.
The difference in responses between the 19-21 and the 22-24 age group is rather
striking. This could be because the 19-21 age group is still in college, and they all stated
that they participated in protests-- likely both the 2011 and 2013 rounds. However, the
22-24 age group was not as eager to participate in the student protests: Only 3 of the 6
people said that they had protested. (Unfortunately, there is no credible data available to
see how many students have participated in protests throughout Chile, making this hard
to compare with a national perspective.) While this dichotomy could be due to the fact
that there were less 22-24 year-olds than 19-21 year-olds in my sample, it is interesting to
note that the youngest Chileans in the survey were the most passionate about how they
felt about Chile’s past. This could certainly be because participation in protest requires a
great deal of passion, so they are more likely to have stronger opinions about the
questions than those who have not protested.
The 24-49 group was also rather nuanced. There were two 24-year-olds, three 27year-olds, one 28-year-old and one 30-year-old, so this group was much less concentrated
than the group of students, and therefore my results are likely less accurate in
representing the entire generation than they could have been. For the first question, this
group was split down the middle, with 3 answers above 5, 3 answers below 5, and one
five, which was labeled as “neither agree nor disagree.” In question two, this age group
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believed that Pinochet’s economic policies helped transform Chile into the stable country
it is today much more than the students who were in college, with only one 3, one 7, and
three 10’s. Question three was answered with all low numbers, which is consistent with
the other age groups. They gave question four numbers between 5 and 7, much unlike the
previous age groups, indicating that they believe-- but to a lesser extent-- that Chile’s
social policies affect today’s social policies. Lastly, the three 27-year-olds gave a one for
their general opinion of Pinochet, but the 28-year-old gave a neutral 5 and the 30-year-old
gave a 3. This age group has an overall less negative perception about Pinochet and how
his policies affect today, but their opinions vary greatly by age. This could be for a variety
of reasons, such as whether or not they knew victims of the human rights abuses, had
family associated with the regime, benefitted from his economic policies, and so on.
Finally, the 50 and 51 year old both gave 1’s to the first question, meaning they
believed that they did not believe his economic policies were beneficial for Chile in the
1970s and 80s. However, they both gave yellow answers-- a 4 and a 7-- to the question
about whether those economic policies helped transform Chile into the stable country it is
today. Neither of them agreed that Pinochet’s social policies were good for Chile during
the dictatorship, but only one of them thought that those policies affected Chile’s social
policies today: One gave that question a 7 while the other one gave it a 1. Finally, they
both gave a 1 for their overall opinion of Pinochet. These results were surprising because
I thought they would be the most nuanced age group because they had experienced the
coup, the dictatorship and now democracy, but the two respondents were rather polarized.
However, only having two respondents does not give a clear picture of the generation at
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all, so these results are not very telling. Overall, the age trends found in my survey
concurred with my hypothesis that the youngest generation of Chileans-- that is, 18-24
year-olds-- were the most vehemently opposed to Pinochet’s legacy.
Again, I must acknowledge how remarkably small my data set was. However, it
still validates my argument about the effects of displays of public memory on the Chilean
public because, at least among people in higher education (i.e., the grand majority of my
respondents), there is a pattern of passionate distaste for Pinochet by the youngest
generation of Chileans. As we saw in the last chapter, displays of public memory are
being shown mostly to students, meaning they are indeed responding to the displays.

Voting Trends
Only three respondents said they did not vote in the last election. Out of those
three, two of them participated in the student protests. One was 20 and the other was 27.
When asked why or why not they chose to protests and vote, the 20 year-old stated that
he was an “anarchist” who was “not interested in the presidential system” but protested
because it was the “only medium for struggle against the dictatorial system.”22 The 27
year-old said that he was out of the country during the election period, but he also said
while he tended to associate with the moderate left, he would have not voted for Bachelet
because she would not be able to fulfill her promises. Everyone else voted, and of them
there were only four that did not participate in protest. One said he thought they “only
serve to make delinquency;” one said she thought that “institutional changes in education

22

No estoy interesado en el sistema presidencial. . . [es el] único medio de lucha contra un sistema
dictatorial.
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are generated by participating through internal means.”23 One girl stated it was because
she was just floja, the Chilean slang term for lazy, and the other person who did not
participate was the same person who gave Pinochet a positive score. My data set does not
necessarily reflect the level of political activism as the rest of the country: Only around
50% of the Chilean population turned out to vote in the 2013 elections, which was their
first-ever voluntary election, which differs from the 92% voter participation in my survey
(Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública N°70 Septiembre - Octubre 2013 93). This shows
that on the whole, my data group was very politically active and passionate about their
beliefs, and their views were largely in line with one another’s.
Along the same lines, this proves once more that my specific data set is not
representative of the Chilean population, so my results cannot necessarily speak for Chile
as a whole. However, my data set does reflect the attitudes of upper-class, educated
Chileans. While one could argue that this discredits my argument because the whole
purpose of the student protests is for the poor to have more access to education, which
would mean the opinions of rich, educated Chileans would be irrelevant, I will reiterate
that the rich university students of PUCV, the University of Chile, and all the other
wealthy CRUCH schools are highly active in the student protests. Therefore, my data set
reflects the attitudes of the Chileans who are instrumental to the protests and will have
the power to change the future of Chile in the long run.
It is certainly worth mentioning, however, that this survey was not adequate in
defining changes in popular opinion between generations. While this part of my original
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los cambios institucionales en educación se generan participando por las vías internas
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hypothesis was not necessarily answered in a way that I would have liked, my data was
sufficient for helping define the young generations’ attitudes, which is quintessential to
my argument about how public memory has played a part in creating change in Chile
because the displays’ target demographics have been the younger generations.
(Because I did not get a good scope of anyone older than 22, and those who did
answer the survey all had similar beliefs, I understand that this does not reflect the rest of
the population. In order to compensate for this lack in my data, later in the chapter I will
compare my study to a study done by CERC, the Center for Contemporary Reality
Studies,24 which is a private organization known for its surveys on political topics, who
did a similar study in September 2013 which had many more respondents of all ages.)

Trends in Feelings about Pinochet
The general pattern I saw in my data was that the younger people were much
more united in their feelings towards each statement, believing that Pinochet did not
make any positive attributions to Chile either during the dictatorship or now. Their
practically unanimous response to question four was, essentially, a social commentary
about Chile: The grand majority of students had participated in the student protests,
meaning that they disagreed with Chile’s current social policies, and their unified
response to question four reflected that they blamed Pinochet for the education policies
they are trying to change. In this sense, my hypothesis was correct: The youngest students

24
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feel the worst about the legacy of Pinochet-- Or at least 15 students who (likely) attend
prestigious private schools in Valparaíso do.
The youngest group also did not believe that Pinochet’s economic policies were
beneficial at all during the 1970’s and 80’s and generally did not believe that those
policies have an effect on today, but the latter half of the respondents did. The 24-50
groups gave much higher numbers to question two, meaning that they do give some
credit to Pinochet for his economic policies whereas the younger people do not. Further,
3 out of 9 of the latter age group had not protested while only 2 out of 15 of the younger
group had not. This shows that the younger respondents are more actively against the
remaining education policies from the Pinochet regime, and likely more ready to take a
strong stance against his legacy.
In terms of question 3, every single respondent besides one answered with a 5 or
below, and the grand majority of the responses were 1’s. This indicates that there is a
general consensus across the board that Pinochet’s social policies were not beneficial for
Chile in the 1970’s and 80’s, which is important because it demonstrates that there is no
nostalgia when thinking about Pinochet’s policies, which is an important aspect of
memory. There was one respondent who answered with a 7, but all of his answered
generally favored Pinochet, giving his/her overall of him as an 8. This is also important
because it demonstrates that there are still people-- even students-- who still support
Pinochet today.
Overall, while the younger respondents were more passionate, the older Chileans
who were surveyed had very similar outlooks on how they felt about Pinochet, but they
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were less passionate, indicating that their feelings about him are more nuanced. My
original hypothesis was that 25-50 year-olds would have the most negative perceptions of
Pinochet, followed by 18-24 year-olds and then by Chileans older than 50. However, my
survey results show that 18-24 year-olds were the most vehemently against Pinochet, and
that passion decreases with age. This could be because the 18-24 respondents were all
students who almost all have participated in protests and are therefore bombarded with
rhetoric against Pinochet (such as the displays of public memory discussed in the
previous chapter) while the older respondents have had more space to reflect on
Pinochet’s legacy in a less polemic environment.

Survey Comparison
As I mentioned above, my survey was not a very adequate indicator of how
Chileans feel as a whole, so to compare my responses, I found a survey done in
September 2013 by CERC. The survey asked 1200 people throughout the country about
various opinions they had on Pinochet and measured their responses by age. Their results
are illustrated in graphs, of which I have chosen three to discuss in terms of my findings.
The first one is a graph entitled “Opinion of the General Pinochet Regime, 1989-2013”:
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In this graph, we see how many people said whether the regime was “Some good
some bad” (blue), “It was only bad” (red), “It was only good” (green), and “Don’t know/
no response” (purple). We see that the most popular response from 1989 until now has
been “Some good some bad,” although it (along with “only good”) has generally
decreased and “only bad” and “I don’t know” have increased. This not only provides
insight into how people’s opinions have generally changed over time, but gives an
indicator of how people feel now-- In 2013, the “only bad” belief is almost as popular as
“some good some bad,” and almost no one thinks it was “only good,” which is in line
with my survey responses.
The next graph is labeled “Opinion of the General Pinochet Regime, according to
age”:
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This graph has four categories: “It was only bad,” “It was good as a whole,” “In
part good, in part bad” and “I don’t know/no response.” The youngest age group was
divided rather evenly between bad, so-so and no response, whereas the 26-40 group
mostly responded with bad or so-so, with more people saying it was bad and less people
not responding. The 41-60 group also had more “in part good in part bad” than “only
bad” answers, but they were not as polarized as the 41-60 group, and the 61+ group had
similar answers. The age group who believed the regime to be good overall more than the
other groups was the 61 and older group. The most important information to take from
this graph is that the 26-40 year-olds believed more strongly than anyone else that the
regime was only bad, and the 41-60 age group thought it was partly good and partly bad.
Both of those findings line up with my original hypothesis that 26-50 year-olds would
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feel the most negatively towards Pinochet while older Chileans would have a more
nuanced view.
While my own data set suggests that 18-24 year-olds are more passionate about
their opposition to Pinochet, the survey done by CERC indicates that 26-40 year-olds are
more passionate. While the results do seem to conflict, the 18-25 year-olds surveyed by
CERC had a significantly higher portion of people who said that they either didn’t know
or didn’t respond, which could potentially make the results less accurate. Either way,
more research needs to be done in order to fully evaluate the question of generational
shifts in thinking among Chileans, especially in regards to public memory.

Conclusion
In sum, my survey data reflects that there is indeed a correlation between
perceptions about Pinochet and age because the youngest generations of Chileans who
took the survey were the most passionate in their answers. While the results for the other
generations were less conclusive, I had significantly less respondents who were out of
college, making my results less accurate. However, their opinions did essentially follow
the general pattern of being less passionate with age. Because my results did not line up
completely with the second survey, more research should be done on the subject of
generational gaps in feelings towards Pinochet, and more research should be done about
how that is affected by public memory.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
Since the transition to democracy in 1990 until rather recently, Chileans have not
sufficiently separated themselves from the legacy of their right-wing dictator, Augusto
Pinochet. Their current voting system and constitution were set up by Pinochet just
before he left office and still remain in place; his neoliberal educational policies are still
intact. Many older Chileans argue that the alegría, or happiness, promised by the
transition to democracy never came because the neoliberal policies imposed by Pinochet
have hardly changed within the last 20 years. However, the youngest generation of
Chileans is doing what no other generation has dared to do-- create that alegría
themselves. They are protesting for reform, engaging in the discussion of his legacy
through public memory, entering congress, becoming more and more passionate in their
opinions, and ultimately, setting the precedence for the future of their country. What
exactly these young Chileans do with their passion for creating a nation that is free from
the grip of the Pinochet regime will unfold with time, but it is certain that Chile’s alegría
is in their hands, and hopefully, what the No campaign song chanted 20 years ago-- la
alegría ya viene-- is finally coming true; maybe happiness really is on its way.
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APPENDIX
Survey questions:
Name (Open answer)
Age (Open answer)
Are you a student? (Yes or no)
Political affiliation (Open answer)
Based on your experiences, rate the following statements from 1 to 10 (1 being
disagree, 5 being neither, 10 being agree)
Q1: Pinochet’s economic policies benefitted Chile in the 1970s and 1980s.
Q2: The economic policies were successful in transforming Chile into the
stable
country it is today.
Q3: Pinochet’s social policies were beneficial for Chilean society during
the
1970s and 80s.
Q4: Pinochet’s social policies still influence social policies today.
Q5: General opinion of Pinochet
Did you vote in the 2013 presidential election? For whom? Why/why not? (Open
answer)
Have you participated in the student protests? Why/why not? (Open answer)
Have you visited the Memory Museum? Do you plan to? Why/why not? (Open
answer)
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Have you seen the film No that came out in 2011? Do you plan to? Why/why not?
(Open answer)
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